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ARGUMENT
I.

Grossen Has Misstated the Standard of Review, Mischaracterized the Issues Presented for Review and Has
Ignored the Fact That this Case is on Appeal from a
Directed Verdict.
In Grossen's standard of appellate review he cites

Grayson Limited Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470
(Utah 1989), and Mackay v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah
1995), and claims that when the court makes findings of fact
they should be upheld on appeal unless "clearly erroneous."
This argument clearly mischaracterizes the issues in this
case.

The issues presented in the DeWitts' brief are legal

and not factual.
Although Grossen tries to characterize these issues as
factual the trial judge made both findings of fact and
conclusions of law.

It is in the conclusions of law section

that all of the issues presented appear (R. 311-10).
Conclusion number one grants Grossen's motion for a directed
verdict on the ground that an oral agreement to cure a
default is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds
(R. 311). This is clearly an issue of law which should be
reviewed under a correction of error standard.

The

existence of a contract is also a question of law, which
should be reviewed under a correction of error standard.
Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 582 (Utah 1998)(citing
Wadsworth Const, v. St. George, 865 P.2d 1373, 1375 (Utah
-1-

Ct. App. 1993) aff'd

898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1995)).

Grossen also ignores the fact that this case came up on
appeal from a directed verdict (R. 311). The standard of
review for an appeal from a directed verdict is found in
Management Comm. Of Graystone Pine Homeowners Ass'n v.
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982).

A directed

verdict is only appropriate when the court is able to
conclude, as a matter of law, that reasonable minds would
not differ on the facts to be determined form the evidence
presented.

The standard requires the evidence to be

examined in the light most favorable to the losing party,
and if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in
the inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support
judgment in favor of the losing party, the directed verdict
cannot be sustained.

Id.; See also

Anderson v. Gribble,

513 P.2d 432 (1973).

The appellate court will "reverse a

directed verdict when the evidence, taken in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, is sufficient to permit a
reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant."

Nay v. General

Motors Copr., 850 P.2d 1260, 1263 (Utah 1993)(cited in Child
v. Gonda, 354 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 23 (Utah 1998)).
Finally, the DeWitts have claimed that the lis pendens
should remain valid pending the appeal.

This issue was also

disposed of in the conclusions of law rather than the

-2-
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However, it is

clear from the terms of the agreement that no power was
surrendered.

The terms are as follows: Grossen agreed to

cancel the trustee's sale, and notice of default.
exchange,

In

Ogden DeWitt agreed to 1) make the back payments,

2) pay the back property taxes, and 3)insure the property.
(See Appellee's brief pages 19-20).
agreement to cure a default.

This is merely an

Grossen retained all of the

rights he received under the trust deed.
Allen v. Kinadon, 723 P.2d 394 (Utah 1986), is a case
which illustrates the types of powers over and concerning
land to which Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended § 25-5-1
refers.

This case deals with the surrender of the buyers

interest in a home under an earnest money agreement.
396.

Id. at

In the same case the court also cites to Cutwriaht v.

Union Savings & Investment Co., 94 P. 984 (1908), which
deals with the surrender of possession.

No such surrender

was made in this case.
Grossen did not surrender the power to hold a trustee's
sale or issue a notice of default.

He entered into an

agreement which, had he not breached it, would have cured
the default and made a trustee's sale unnecessary.

Grossen

clearly still had the power to issue a notice of default and
to hold a trustee's sale should a future default accure.
Neither of these powers was surrendered.

If, as Grossen

claimed, he later discovered another breach of the deed of
-4-
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involved major modifications "t t IK iiidt.Hi I .I I I i i in
former involved an alleged oral modification which would
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Tin

a

have reduced the payments.

Zion, 538 P.2d at 1322.

The

latter involved an alleged oral agreement to delay operation
of the whole contract pending an investigation by one of the
parties.

Combined Metals, 267 P. at 1031.

Again, this is a

separate agreement regarding a cure of a default that had no
affect on the underlying trust deed.
Grossen also claims that because the notice of default
is required to be in writing any agreement to cure a default
must be in writing.

Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended § 57-1-

31(1) sets forth the procedures for curing a default after a
notice of default has issued.

Nowhere does the statute

require a trustor who has defaulted to make any writing.
All that is required is performance —

a tender of the money

necessary to cure the default.
The policy behind the statute of frauds is also
relevant.

Generally, the statute is used as a shield to

protect a party from paying money on an oral contract which
he or she has not agreed to.

It is the party seeking to

collect on an alleged debt that is prevented from
collecting.

In this case Grossen is attempting to use the

statute as a sword to prevent DeWitt from paying money to
cure a default.

The policies behind the statute of frauds

are not served by allowing Grossen to use the statute as a
sword to deprive DeWitt of the benefit he had bargained for.

-6-
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§ JbU (1964) icitations o m i t t e d ) .

i iener ri 1 I , In hi 1 IhiL if thr purpose of the promisor is

to further his own interest rather then to merely underwrite

the debt of another, it is an original undertaking not
within the statute of frauds.

Nephi Processing Plant, Inc.

v. Western Coop. Hatch. 242 F. 2d 567 (10th Cir. 1957).
The evidence before the trial court shows that this was
a primary responsibility undertaken by Ogden DeWitt to pay a
specified amount.
Ogden DeWitt.

The agreement was between Grossen and

Ogden DeWitt was not to act solely as a

surety or a guarantor for the money owed on the deed of
trust.

Grossen testified that one of the reasons her called

the "deal" off was that he was upset that "the property had
been transferred to Mr. Ogden DeWitt without [Grossen's]
knowledge." (Line 9 of page 14 of Grossen's deposition.)
The fact that this was an original rather than a collateral
agreement is also evidenced by the fact that Ogden DeWitt
tendered the back payments as per the agreement and did not
wait to see if they would be paid by his brother.
If, however, the court finds that the relationship is
not clearly an original one, it must remand to the trial
court.

The Supreme Court of Utah held in 0'Hair that the

question of whether or not there is an original promise
under a given set of circumstances depends on the intention
of the parties which is a question of fact for determination
by the fact finder.

O'Hair v. Kounalis, 463 P.2d at 801.

-8-

C.

Part Performance of The Oral Agreement Was
Sufficient to Exempt the Agreement from the Effect
of the Statute of Frauds.

Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, § 25-5-8 states that,
"[n]othing in this chapter contained shall be construed to
abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific
performance of agreements in case of part performance
thereof."
In Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Company, 305 P.2d 480
(Utah 1956), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the
requirements for removing an oral contract from the statute
of frauds.
First, the oral contract and its terms must be
clear and definite; second, the act done in
performance of the contract must be equally clear
and definite; and third, the acts must be in
reliance on the contract. Such acts in reliance
must be such that a) they would not have been
performed had the contract not existed, and b) the
failure to perform would result in a fraud on the
performer who relied, since damages would be
inadequate.
Id. at 484.

The oral agreement between Ogden DeWitt and

Grossen satisfies all three of these requirements.
The terms of the agreement are set forth plainly in the
trial court's second findings of fact (R. 313, paragraphs 68).

Ogden DeWitt agreed to pay the arrearages on the trust

deed in the amount of $1,617, in two payments, one of $1,000
by the following Monday, and one of $617 paid by the end of
the next week.

Ogden DeWitt also agreed to pay the back
-9-

property tax and to insure the property.

There is only

disagreement as to the timing of the payment of back taxes
and insurance.

Ogden DeWitt testified at page 688 of the

record (line 12) that he would "make sure those [payments
for taxes and insurance] get taken care of over the next two
months."

But, these are not essential terms and can be

supplied by the court.

In Christensen v. Christensen, 339

P.2d 101 (Utah 1959) the court was faced with a similar
situation.

The court found that the only uncertainty in

the contract was the timing of payment which "necessarily is
implied and calls for performance within a reasonable time.
. ."

Id. at 104.

Furthermore, the court held that the

"defendants waived any defense as to uncertainty of time of
payment . . . by repeatedly accepting the services and
livestock which . . . were rendered and delivered under the
contract."

Id.

There is some question as to whether an

express time for the payment of the taxes and insurance was
set forth.

Ogden DeWitt testified payments for taxes and

insurance were to be done within two months (R. 866:13).
Grossen at first testified taxes and insurance were not
discussed as part of the deal (R. 502:12; 501:25; 499:5).
Later Grossen testified taxes and insurance were discussed
and they had to be paid immediately.

Since this was decided

on a directly verdict, the facts should be viewed in the
light most favorable to the DeWitts; namely, taxes and
-10-

insurance were to be paid within two months.
The acts done by DeWitt were also clear and definite,
and were exclusively referable to the oral agreement.
DeWitt would not have paid Grossen $1,617 if there had not
been an agreement.

There is also no dispute as to whether

Grossen knew the payments were made in reliance on the
agreement.

At trial, under oath, Grossen admitted that he

accepted the checks as payments under the agreement.

(Page

8 of appellant's brief, R. 466).
Grossen's failure to perform has also resulted in a
fraud because damages would not be adequate to make the
DeWitts whole.

It is well settled that real property is

unique and cannot be adequately compensated for with
monetary damages.

Utah D.O.T. v. 6200 South A s s o c , 872

P.2d 462, 467 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (real estate has always
been considered unique because no two parcels can be exactly
alike) citing Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v.
Mitsui Investment. Inc., 522 P.2d 1370, 1373 (Utah 1974).
See also, 5A Corbin on Contracts 1143, at 126 (1964) (noting
that specific performance is an appropriate remedy in a
contract case involving real estate because land is unique).
Grossen also claims that the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds only applies where there has been
substantial part performance over a significant period of
time.

He apparently inferred this requirement from the fact
-11-

that contracts for the sale of land generally involve large
amounts of money paid over a relatively long period of time.
Unfortunately, he cannot cite a single case which has
adopted the rule he would have this court follow.

If his

contention were true it would not be possible to take a
contract out of the statute of frauds where the time for
performance was short or the amount at stake was small.

The

requirements set forth above in Randall do not require the
part performance to extend over a specific period of time
nor is a specific dollar amount set forth.

The sufficiency

of the part performance should be viewed in relationship to
the agreement which has been relied on.

In the case at bar

DeWitt had already payed $1,617 in reliance on the contract.
The back taxes amounted to approximately $1,300, including
penalty and interest.

Even with the added cost of fire

insurance on the home, DeWitt had already tendered more than
half of the amount due in reliance on the contract.

One

half of the total amount owing on the contract is sufficient
to take the contract out of the statute of frauds based on
part performance.
The supreme court in In Re Roth's Estate, 269 P.2d 278
(Utah 1954), determined that where the party seeking
specific performance of a contract for the sale of land had
"paid nearly one-half of the purchase price and made
valuable improvements on the property," the evidence
-12-

justified a decree of specific performance based on part
performance.

Similarly, the Utah courts have held that

where the oral agreement was for the sale of seven lots, a
down payment and two interest payments as well as full
payment for three of the seven lots was sufficient part
performance to take the agreement out of the statute of
frauds.

Baldwin v. Vantage Corp., 676 P.2d 413, 417 (Utah

1984).
Grossen also claims that the trial court determined in
its findings of fact that Ogden DeWitt's actions were
insufficient to establish the partial performance exception
to the statute of frauds.

This argument is disingenuous.

Grossen's counsel is trying to rewrite the court's findings.
There was never a finding stating there was insufficient
facts to establish part performance or estoppel.

Nowhere in

the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is the
doctrine of part performance even mentioned.

(R. 315.)

The

trial court also made no such finding in its Ruling dated
September 5, 1997. (R. 308.)

At page 624, line 24, of the

record the trial court says, "I don't think part performance
has application."

The trial court continued at page 623,

line 7:
I don't believe that part performance, being the
payment of checks by Mr. Ogden, satisfies the
Statute of Frauds, insofar as the requirement that
there be a written modification to any written
Notice of Default. I think part — I simply deny
-13-

relief under the doctrine of part performance.
On page 19 of Grossen's brief he claims that "The trial
court ruled that accepting, but not cashing, 2 checks for
three weeks paid by one with no interest in the property is
not sufficient partial performance, especially where
insurance was not obtained and back taxes were not paid as
agreed."

Grossen cites no authority for this claim

undoubtedly because there is no authority for the claim.
This statement cannot be found in the Amended Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 315) or in the Ruling dated
September 5, 1997.

(R. 308.)

As part of this argument, Grossen contends that the
issues of part performance and estoppel are factual issues
which should only be reversed on appeal if clearly
erroneous.

(Appellee's brief page 14). But, as has already

been shown, these are issues of law and there is no dispute
as to the facts other than the timing of the payment for
taxes and insurance.

Also, this appeal is one from a

directed verdict where the evidence must be examined in the
light most favorable to the losing party, and if there is a
reasonable basis in the evidence and in the inferences to be
drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in favor of
the losing party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained.
Management C O M , of Graystone Pines Homeowners Ass'n v.
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982) .
-14-

Although Grossen criticizes Dewitt's use of the
article, The Doctrine of Part Performance as Applied to Oral
Land Contracts in Utah, 9 Utah L. Rev. 106 (1964), the Utah
Supreme Court found it persuasive enough to cite in Martin
v, Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275-76 (Utah 1983).

Grossen also

claims that the quoted section refers to the terms of an
oral agreement, not the actual existence of the agreement.
This distinction is not significant because Grossen has
admitted the existence of the agreement over and over.

(See

Appellant's brief pages 7 and 8 ) .
III. Grossen's Breach of the Dewitt-Grossen Agreement Did
Not Allow Ogden Dewitt to Fully Perform Under the
Agreement.
On page 19 of Grossen's brief he sets forth the terms
of the agreement between he and Ogden DeWitt, "In exchange
for Earl Grossen canceling the trustee's sale and canceling
the Notice of Default, Ogden DeWitt also agreed to
immediately bring current any and all taxes and to insure
the property."

He then claims that Ogden DeWitt failed to

fully perform under the contract.

However, as already

argued in section II (c) of this brief, the only
disagreement over the terms of the agreement was the timing
of the payment of back taxes and insurance on the house.
When viewed in the light most favorable to the DeWitt's, as
required for a directed verdict, the DeWitt's had two months
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to get the taxes and insurance paid (R. 688). After
accepting payment under the agreement and before the time
had elapsed, Grossen told Ogden DeWitt that the deal was
off.
Grossen also urges that the agreement was not "clear
and definite" enough to be enforceable.

That is a strange

argument since the terms of the agreement are outlined in
both the trial court's Second Findings of Fact (R. 313) and
in Grossen's own brief (See Facts, paragraph 7, and on pages
19 and 20). DeWitt's dispute that the taxes and insurance
had to be paid immediately, but there is no dispute as to
the rest of the terms.

Most importantly the agreement

fulfills all of the requirements set forth in Randall v.
Tracy Collins Trust Co., 305 P.2d 480 (1956).

(See Part II

(c) of this brief.)
IV.

Section 57-1-31 is Applicable to This Case.
Grossen has waived any right he has to claim that Utah

code § 57-1-31 does not apply in this case because he raises
the argument for the first time on appeal.

Issues not

raised at trial cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.

State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994).

At no time at the trial level did Grossen claim that § 57-131 did not apply.
As a matter of fact, claiming that § 57-1-31 does not
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apply in this case would pull the proverbial rug out from
under Grossenf s argument that the agreement between he and
DeWitt is required to be in writing under the statute of
frauds.

At trial the judge said that "that section does

apply in this case" and since that section required a
recorded notice of default to be in writing, any agreement
to cure the default must also be in writing. (R. 652:5.)

If

this section does not apply, the basis for the judge's
reasoning falls apart.
V.

Grossen Has Waived His Right to Claim the Three Month
Limitation in § 57-1-31 by Accepting Payment of the
$1,617.
While it is true that § 57-1-31 gives a trustor a

statutory right to cure a default within three months of a
notice of default, it does not prohibit a trustor from
curing after that time.

The Utah Supreme Court and this

Court have recognized that acceptance of rental payments may
constitute waiver of a claim of breach.

Olympus Hills

Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food, 889 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994); Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain
Theatres, Inc., 560 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1977).
reasoning is also applicable to this case.

This

Grossen not only

accepted back payments on the trust deed he also accepted
February's payment. (See Trial Exhibit #30, copies of checks
tendered to Grossen.)

After agreeing to take these payments
-17-

as a cure to the default, Grossen should not be allowed to
claim that there was no right to cure the default.

His

actions are a clear waiver of any statutory limitation on
the time allowed to cure the default.
VI.

This Court Does Have Jurisdiction in This Matter
Because Appeal is Taken From the Amended Findings.
It is true that the original judgment in this matter

was filed on May 7, 1997, and that the DeWitt's Rule 52(b)
motion was denied.

However, despite the fact that the

DeWitt's 52(b) motion was denied, Grossen's counsel
submitted a brand new set of findings of fact and
conclusions of law which bore little resemblance to the
original findings and conclusions originally signed on May
6, 1997.

This new set of findings deletes eight findings

previously entered by the trial court.

(See Defendant's

Rule 52(b) Motion to Strike Findings Not Authorized by the
Court, including copies of both the original(R. 228-232) and
amended findings (R. 311-315), attached hereto as Exhibit
B).

The new findings also added 12 new paragraphs

containing findings that were not in the original May 6,
findings signed by the court. (See Exhibit B ) . None of the
issues addressed by the new findings were discussed in any
of the Rule 52(b) motion pleadings, so there was no basis
for the wholesale revision of the court's previous findings.
The new findings signed by the trial judge on September
-18-

25,

1997, also contradict the original findings filed by the

c o i :i i: I: a i I ::i d. e in D I i s 1: i a t e d t: 1 I B C :: i I f i I s :i :) i I a s t : • !: 1 I a J e :j a 1
conclusions and the status of the court ruling.

For

i n s t a. n c e t h e f :i r s 1: s e t :> f f :i i i ::i :i i I :j s o f f a ::: 1: a i i d c o n c J: i I s i o n s
of law stated that "Earl Grossen and Ogden DeWitt reached an
f

agreement regardina the payment of the arrearage
231.)

P.

But the new i_:.u-ngs adaec a new v . .: •-:.-j;. _:._.:.j-. J

the whole meaning of the sentence

• :. w reads,

xx

Earl

Grossei i a.i i ::i 0 g d e n DeWi 11: i: e a c h e d . : c u i » u.^ v<= a g r e e m e n t
regarding the payment of the arrearage
F iir t h e rm o i e

F

313, )

11 :n :i s a g r e e m e n t c a n n c t I: e a t e n t a t :i A r e a g r e e m e n f .

As argued above the terms of the agreement are clear and not
in dispute.

After negotiating the terms of the agreement

Ogden DeWitt accepted the terms by tendering the back
payments.

:.~e Grossen accepted the tender, the agreement

Paragrapn 7 of rne original findings of facts and
conclusions of law state that "because of the courts ruling
on the statute of frauds issue, the court did not make
further findings of fact as to what the terms of the
a g r e e in e :r i I: ^ e i: e

(I : 2 3 0 )

H o w e v e :i :

1:1: i e a m e n d e il f i n d i n g s

and conclusions ignore that court's previous statements and
go : n tc specifically state the terms of the agreement.

The

amended findings and conclusions include time requirements
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on which the agreement was based (R. 313) and include a
multitude of new paragraphs which add new facts regarding
Mr.

Grossen's beliefs as to the other violations of the

trust deed and telephone calls made to Ogden DeWitt.
Since no evidence was taken between the May 6th
findings and the new findings there was no basis for
Grossen's counsel rewriting the findings, in fact he had
received no authorization from the court to do so.

It is

disingenuous for Grossen's counsel to make wholesale changes
to a signed set of findings of fact, ask the court to sign
the new findings, include the new findings as an exhibit in
Grossen's brief, argue from the new set of findings, and
then claim that the DeWitt's appeal is untimely because it
should have been taken from the first set of findings.

The

new set of findings was not signed until September 24, 1997.
It was from the new set of findings that the DeWitts have
taken their appeal.

It is from the second set of findings

that Grossen has argued his case.

It is simply wrong for

Grossen to claim that the DeWitts should have filed an
appeal before the final judgment and the Amended Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law were ever signed.
Conclusion
The issues presented for review by this appeal are
issues of law.

The appeal is taken from legal conclusions
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m a d e b y the trial court that can be found in the conclusions
of I a/1! ; s e c t i c •: 1 • :: f tl le Ainei ided "i: " i i K l i i : T< >:
C o n c l u s i o n s of L a w (R , 31 1 )

1 I "a, ::t ai id

Because Lhey are issues of law

this co i i r t s h o i i ] d r e v :i e x ; 1:1 I e c o n c J I i s :i : n s f c i: c o r r e c t ri e s s a n d
should grant no deference to the trial court's c o n c l u s i o n s .
U n i t e d Park City M i n e s C o . v. Greater Park City C o . , 87 0
P. 2 ::I 880, 8 85

;t : 1:ii il l 3 9 93) .

F u r t h e r m o r e , this is an appeal from, a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t
wh e r e 1:1 i = evi den c e i s ex c.

- d :i i I 1:1: i

. . 1 11: rnc s t f a^ K: • r a b 1 e

to t h e losing p a r t y and if there is a reasonable basis in
the e v i d e n c e and in the inferences to b e drawn

therefrom

that w o u l d support judgment in favor of the losing party,
the d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t cannot be sustained.
of G r a y s t o n e E I n e H o m e o w n e r s Ass'i I v

Management

Comm.

Graystoi le P i n e s , I n c . ,

652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) .
The D e w i t t - G r o s s e n agreement does

-

->•-'

s t a t u t e of frauds and therefore does ;uL need to oe in
w r i t i n g to b e enforced.

The agreement does n o t require

Gr ossei I I:c • sur: r ei ider power over or concerning the p r o p e r t y .
G r o s s e n retained all of h i s power over the land u n d e r the
• •-•'j"

'--

ssen

a g r e e m e n t w a s aj- original db opposed to a collateral
a g r e e m e n t to answer for the debt of a n o t h e r ,

O d g e n DeWitt

did n o t agree to b e c o m e only a surety for Derel D e w i t t ,
also took on p r i m a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the agreement to
-21-

He

cure the default.

Ogden DeWitt's tender and Grossen's

acceptance of the checks pursuant to the agreement was also
sufficient to exempt the agreement from the effect of the
statute of frauds.

Moreover, it was Grossen's breach of the

DeWitt-Grossen agreement which did not allow Ogden DeWitt to
fully perform under the agreement.
Although Grossen contends that § 57-1-31 is not
applicable to this case, he has raised this argument for the
first time on appeal and, therefore, has waived his right to
make that claim.

Section 57-1-31 is also the statutory

basis for reinstating a mortgage.

By accepting tender of

the back payments Grossen took sufficient action to
reinstate the trust deed.

However, by making a "deal" and

accepting payment of the $1,617 after the three month
limitation in § 57-1-31, Grossen has waived his right to
claim that three month limitation, and the Court should
recognize an effective cure of the default.

Finally, this

court does have jurisdiction in this matter because this
appeal is from the final judgment in this matter, which is
the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law signed
by the trial court on September 24, 1997.
In light of the above arguments, the DeWitts ask this
Court to find as a matter of law that: 1) a cure of a
default need not be in writing to be effective - a cure of a
default can occur by performance; 2) that even if a cure of
-22-

a default falls under the statute of frauds, the DeWitts'
part perforrii.in••>> w,-is r.iiffji ieiil In Ldke the contract out of
the statute of frauds; 3) the directed verdict against the
DeWitts should be vacated ox i the basi s of par t: per forinance
and estoppel; and 4) a lis pendens remains valid during the
pendency of an appeal.
DATED t.

:

o?_ day of

fJ^^„J^\

1998.

DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.

£n.<t*n Qu^9.^
GORDON W. DUVAL
Attorney for Appellants
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Page 13
Q And on that occasion, could you explain what
1
happened, how the default was cured or —
2
A The details of this are in these papers.
3
Q Okay.
4
5
A And there's a promissory note there signed
by Afton Dewitt and Derrick Dewitt and I think it's
| 6
dated November - the 12th day of December, 1992. There
7
may be one later than that. Yeah, there's one later,
8
June 1993, the 1st of June, 1993, and that's signed by
9
both parties.
| 10
Q Do you mind if Ms. Petersen takes a look at
jn
these documents? And by any chance, did you bring any
12
checks with you?
| 13
14
A I destroyed them. They weren't any good to
me because he had lied to me.
15
Q When did you destroy those checks?
16
A And misled me. After I got through telling
17
him on the phone that the deal was off —
i 18
Q Do you know 19
A — for chicanery.
20
Q Do you know what date that was?
21
A Probably March or April of this year.
22
Something like that. I can't recall.
23
Q And when you say that the deal was off, what
24
are you referring to?
25

Pa;
Q Are you referring to Kevin Dewitt?
A Or Kevin, yeah. Derrick had it first and
then Kevin.
Q Okay. Let's go back to the checks that
you're referring to. You said that you received a check
for SI,000?
A As I recall it was about a thousand.
Q Do you recall the date that you received
that check?
A I think it was February. Somewhere around
in there, February or March.
Q So you think that would have been at the end
of February, or at the beginning of February?
A It seems like it was towards the end of
February. I tore the checks up and threw them away.
They were no good to me.
Q Did you receive that ~ did you receive that
check or any checks prior to the trustee's sale0
A Yes.
Q Do you recall the date of the trustee's
sale?
A I think it was April 1996. I think we have
that date. And it was advertised and Dewitts were aw
of it. And incidentally, they didn't show up for the
sale.

P
Page 14
A 1 told him that there was no deal, that I
Q Who did show up for the sale?
1
->
wasn't going to take the checks and cash them. And I
A Mr. Crabtree. my attorney at the time.
didn't, I didn't cash any of them.
Q So Mr. Crabtree was the attorney that
3
4 conducted the sale?
Q Is the deal referring to his having tendered
those checks to you -A David Crabtree, right. And there's a copy
5
i\
A The deal was that the back taxes weren't
6 of the sale.
paid as they should have been, according to the
7
Q Do you know who Scott Ryther is?
A I don't have a clue.
*L\ contract, and the house had been put under a lien of
8
9 ' 22,000, which I was very irate about, and the property
9
Q Okay. So you destroyed the checks that you
VC) had been transferred to Mr. Ogden Dewitt without my
10 received; is that true?
1 knowledge, without my information,. My attorney had to
A And I told you why.
11
I do research on that, David Crabtree, and he has the
Q Do you know how Mr. Ogden Dewitt arrived
12
13 the figures that the checks were written out for?
\ David Crabtree file, Mr. Cline. And I was very irate,
14
A As I recall, he came to those totals that
14 to put it mildly, about what was going on so I told him
15 the checks were written for to make up for back payr
15 the deal was off, and he knows that.
16 that had not been paid on the property. And there v/<
Q And, again, do you have an approximate date
16
17 a whole bunch of payments since then that weren't rr
17 that would have been?
Q Did it include any other fees or charges?
18
A That he gave me the last check, I think it
18
A Not that I can recall. I don't think it
19
19 was in April or March of this year.
did.
And if it did, it wasn't made clear.
20
Q When you say last check, that's referring
20
Q And so you stated earlier that as of
21
21 to December,
you believe that it was seven or eight moi
22
A He gave me one I think for 1,000 and another
22
23 in arrearage, the property?
23 one for 1,600 and something. And those were the back
A I don't remember exactly how many months
24
24 payments of Derrick Dewitt's rent payments or house
25 would have to go back and calculate. I don't know
25 payments that weren't paid.
1
2
3
4
.5
6
"7
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